Interest rates, Eurobonds and intra-European exchange rate misalignments: The challenge of sustainable adjustments in the Eurozone by Duwicquet, Vincent et al.
Interest rates, Eurobonds and intra-European exchange
rate misalignments: The challenge of sustainable
adjustments in the Eurozone
Vincent Duwicquet, Jacques Mazier, Jamel Saadaoui
To cite this version:
Vincent Duwicquet, Jacques Mazier, Jamel Saadaoui. Interest rates, Eurobonds and intra-
European exchange rate misalignments: The challenge of sustainable adjustments in the Euro-
zone. 2016. <hal-01295438>
HAL Id: hal-01295438
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01295438
Submitted on 31 Mar 2016
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Documents 
de travail 
 
 
                                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Faculté des sciences 
économiques et de 
gestion
Pôle européen de gestion et 
d'économie (PEGE)
61 avenue de la Forêt Noire
F-67085 Strasbourg Cedex
Secrétariat du BETA
Géraldine  Del Fabbro
Tél. : (33) 03 68 85 20 69
Fax : (33) 03 68 85 20 70
g.delfabbro @unistra.fr
www.beta-umr7522.fr
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
« Interest rates, Eurobonds and intra-European 
exchange rate misalignments: The challenge of 
sustainable adjustments in the Eurozone » 
 
Version révisée du document de travail 2015-03 
  
 
 
Auteurs 
 
 
Vincent Duwicquet, Jacques Mazier, Jamel Saadaoui 
 
 
Document de Travail n° 2016 – 19 
 
 
Mars 2016 
 
 
 
 
Interest rates, Eurobonds and intra-European exchange 
rate misalignments: The challenge of sustainable 
adjustments in the eurozone 
 
Vincent Duwicquet*   Jacques Mazier**   Jamel Saadaoui*** 
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monetary union characterized by a large heterogeneity. Exchange rate adjustments being 
impossible, it remains very few efficient alternative mechanisms. At the level of the whole 
eurozone the euro is close to its equilibrium parity. But the euro is strongly overvalued for 
Southern European countries, France included, and largely undervalued for Northern European 
countries, especially Germany. This paper gives a new evaluation of these exchange rate 
misalignments inside the eurozone, using a FEER approach, and examines the evolution of 
competitiveness. In a second step, we use a two-country SFC model of a monetary union with 
endogenous interest rates and Eurobonds issuance. Three main results are found. Firstly, facing 
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1. Introduction 
“The second implication of the absence of fiscal transfers is that countries need to invest 
more in other mechanisms to share the cost of shocks. Even with more flexible economies, 
internal adjustment will always be slower than it would be if countries had their own 
exchange rate. Risk-sharing is thus essential to prevent recessions from leaving permanent 
scars and reinforcing economic divergence.” 
Mario Draghi (2015). 
The euro crisis shed lights on the nature of alternative adjustment mechanisms in a monetary 
union characterized by a large heterogeneity. Adjustment mechanisms are defined in a broad 
sense as mechanisms that ensure a return to the initial situation or, possibly, to recover towards 
full employment after a slowdown. It remains very few efficient alternative mechanisms in the 
absence of exchange rate flexibility as underlined by the quotation of Mario Draghi. Budgetary 
policy could play a major role. In the United States, budgetary policy stabilizes 20 percent of 
shocks on the GDP (Italianer and Pisani-Ferry, 1992). But there is no equivalent in the European 
case. Well integrated capital markets, with portfolio diversification and intra-zone credit, have 
been proposed as a powerful adjustment mechanism by the “international risk sharing” 
approach. Intra-zone credit and capital income from international portfolio would have 
stabilization coefficients around 20-30 percent each (Asdrubali and Kim, 2004). These results 
have been used during the 2000 by proponents of liberal economic policies in the EU to promote 
deeper financial integration instead of having to develop a federal budget (European 
Commission, 2007; Trichet, 2007)1. This approach is still present in the last Action Plan of the 
European Commission (2015) on the Capital Market Union with the goal of creating one single 
                                                 
1 Mario Draghi (2015) acknowledges the crucial role of budgetary policies and that this approach “the less public 
risk-sharing we want, the more private risk-sharing we need” could be insufficient in case of financial storms in 
the future. However, he concludes that Members States should achieve structural reforms to have sound public 
finances in order to be able to deal with periods of financial and economic turmoil. 
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market for shares, bonds and securitized bank loans. However, the theoretical basis, the 
empirical methodology and the results appear highly questionable (Clévenot and Duwicquet, 
2011). 
Consequently, relative wage and price flexibility are proposed in order to take place, at least 
partially, of exchange rate adjustments. Actually, these mechanisms allow only a very slow and 
partial return to equilibrium with an important cost in terms of growth and employment and 
with large differences between countries, due to huge structural specificities. They are more 
inefficient when they are implemented simultaneously in interdependent countries, as it is the 
case in the eurozone, especially in the Southern European countries. They are more efficient in 
a largely opened economy like Ireland than in rather closed ones like Greece or even Portugal 
(Mazier and Saglio, 2008). 
This situation reflects a rather simple diagnosis. At the level of the whole eurozone, the current 
account is close to equilibrium and the fiscal deficit is smaller than in many other OECD 
countries. The euro is close to its equilibrium parity. But intra-European imbalances are huge. 
The euro is strongly overvalued for Southern European countries, France included, and largely 
undervalued for Northern European countries, especially Germany (Jeong et al., 2010). These 
overvaluations slow growth and induce fiscal and current deficits in the South while 
undervaluations boost growth in the North via exports, especially towards the rest of the 
eurozone, and deficits are reduced. This situation is equivalent to implicit positive transfers in 
favor of the North and negative transfers at the detriment of the South, which are largely ignored 
in the public debate. 
In order to investigate these issues, Duwicquet et al. (2013) have used a two-country SFC model 
of a monetary union along the lines of Godley and Lavoie (2006, 2007a, 2007b), Lavoie (2003) 
and Duwicquet and Mazier (2010, 2011). The model described the real sector and assets and 
liabilities of economic agents in order to analyze financial integration in a consistent manner. 
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A federal budget has been introduced with federal expenditures and social transfers financed 
by federal taxes and Eurobonds issuance. Three results have been found. The stabilizing role of 
such a federal budget has been confirmed facing asymmetric shocks or exchange rate 
misalignments within the monetary union. Similarly, the stabilizing role of Eurobonds, used to 
finance European investment projects, has been illustrated. But the model was limited to 
exogenous interest rates, which can only be regarded as a preliminary step, as we have assisted 
to large movements of interest rates in Southern European countries since the onset of the euro 
crisis.  
This paper is organized as follow. In a first part, we give a new evaluation of these exchange 
rate misalignments inside the eurozone, using a FEER approach, and we discuss the structural 
heterogeneity of the eurozone. In a second part, we introduce an extended version with 
endogenous interest rates of an SFC model of a monetary union. With this model, we examine 
to what extent asymmetric evolutions due to intra-European misalignments can be adjusted. 
Interest rates on public bonds are now endogenous. Fiscal policy is partially endogenous and 
reacts to financial markets evolution with the implementation of budget cuts. The possibility to 
increase intra-zone financing allows a reduction of the pressure on interest rates. Eurobonds are 
introduced and used in two ways, on the one hand, in order to pool a part of the European public 
debts and, in the other hand, to finance European investments in growth sectors. A combination 
of tax rebate and budget cuts is also investigated. 
2. Intra-European exchange rates misalignments and structural 
heterogeneity 
Since the beginning of the 2000s, a surge of current account imbalances within the eurozone 
has been observed in spite of a rather balanced current account for the whole area. On the one 
side, Northern European countries have accumulated huge current account surpluses and on the 
other side, Southern European countries have run important current account deficits. After 
2009, current account deficits of Southern European countries have been reduced mainly 
4 
because of restrictive policies and internal devaluations. These evolutions reflect, at least 
partially, the increasing exchange rate misalignments inside the eurozone. By using a FEER 
approach, introduced by Williamson (1983), Jeong et alii (2010) and Duwicquet et alii (2013) 
have shown a split within the eurozone between some countries increasingly undervalued (like 
Germany, Austria, Netherlands and Finland) and others increasingly overvalued (like Greece, 
Portugal, Spain and France). As we can see in table 1, on average between 2005 and 2010, 
Germany, Austria, Netherlands and Finland have been undervalued by 13 percent while Greece, 
Portugal, Spain and France have been overvalued by 23 percent. 
Table 1: Misalignments in real effective terms (in percent) 
 EU FRA GER ITA SPA AUT FIN IRL NLD PRT GRC 
1994 -3.4 3.1 -10.5 9.2 0.6 -3.1 -1.7 3.8 0.8 4.3 13.9 
1995 1.2 1.4 -9.4 11.2 8.8 -8.3 7.2 3.8 0.8 7.0 1.3 
1996 4.2 3.9 -4.8 9.4 -4.6 -9.2 9.3 0.8 0.4 -11.3 -12.5 
1997 3.5 15.2 -3.2 8.2 -0.8 -8.8 16.9 0.6 1.8 -19.3 -12.7 
1998 0.6 15.4 -5.2 5.1 -1.4 -3.5 17.4 -0.8 -2.2 -18.5 -8.4 
1999 2.0 19.5 -8.1 1.8 -6.9 -2.9 17.6 0.4 -0.7 -23.7 -17.8 
2000 0.1 7.4 -8.4 -0.7 -10.0 1.1 21.4 -2.2 -3.7 -28.7 -25.2 
2001 6.9 7.6 -3.5 -1.2 -13.0 -3.5 22.2 -5.4 -6.4 -34.3 -24.3 
2002 6.6 2.4 3.5 -4.2 -12.9 9.8 23.0 -6.2 -8.2 -27.4 -22.4 
2003 2.2 -3.0 2.2 -6.9 -13.6 2.9 12.0 -6.8 -3.0 -23.8 -11.8 
2004 6.6 -5.7 9.0 -1.9 -22.0 1.2 12.7 -7.2 -1.1 -33.8 1.0 
2005 1.8 -11.2 11.6 -1.2 -30.7 3.8 5.5 -7.3 1.6 -44.2 -4.6 
2006 0.3 -8.8 16.5 -0.7 -34.0 7.9 9.4 -5.1 6.1 -42.5 -5.1 
2007 0.1 -12.8 18.4 -0.3 -42.0 10.4 11.5 -11.1 3.1 -33.8 -7.4 
2008 -2.6 -19.8 14.3 -5.7 -46.7 12.6 4.5 -14.1 0.0 -45.9 -10.1 
2009 0.6 -11.6 16.3 -2.0 -21.4 7.2 -0.4 -2.5 2.1 -35.4 -0.4 
2010 1.6 -8.9 20.2 -3.2 -21.5 9.8 3.4 8.1 8.4 -26.8 -11.5 
2011 8.2 -15.4 16.9 -4.1 -19.5 6.9 -7.3 3.9 6.6 -22.1 -46.2 
2012 14.1 -14.1 19.9 4.3 -1.3 7.8 -5.2 13.0 7.1 2.7 -15.9 
Notes: Forecasts for 2012 based on IMF WEO October 2013; See Jeong et al. (2010) for a complete description 
of the model of world trade and the methodology used to compute ERMs. Source: authors’ calculations. A positive 
(negative) number indicates an undervaluation (overvaluation) expressed in percent of the observed value. See 
appendix A for details about the methodology used to correct current account balances from the effect of 
differences between output gaps in the eurozone. This correction, especially important after the crisis (due to a de-
synchronization of business cycles in the euro area), is based on Bayoumi and Faruqee (1998). 
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These intra-European exchange rate misalignments reflect a strong structural heterogeneity 
between European countries at several levels (nature of the international specialization, size 
and productivity of the firms, R&D effort and qualification of the labor force). They are at the 
heart of the current problems of the eurozone. However, since the onset of the euro crisis in 
2010, a reduction of misalignments has been observed for most of the Southern European 
countries. Irish, Spanish, Italian and even Portuguese euros seemed no more overvalued in 
2012. But Greek and French euros remained overvalued by around 15 percent and German euro 
undervalued by around 20 percent. These movements have been mainly driven by large real 
effective devaluations in Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece, as shown in figure 1 with the 
evolutions of the relative unit labor cost (RULC) i.e. the real effective exchange rates based on 
ULC. These politics of internal devaluation have been very painful and has led to a deep 
recession in Greece, as in other Southern European countries, with a reduction of current 
deficits mainly due to the shrink of imports, but with limited improvement of public finances. 
Figure 1: Real effective exchange rates based on unit labor cost 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on European Commission data (AMECO), basis 100 in 2000. 
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The financial crisis of 2008 was, in any case, due to a rise of public deficits and debts. 
Nevertheless, it has led to a huge increase in the government deficits and debts due to measures 
implemented to rescue banks and support the economic activity and also to the fall of tax 
incomes induced by the recession. Monetary policy also became expansionary with a decline 
of the interest rate of the European Central Bank (ECB). But the weakest European countries 
faced difficulties to finance their deficits as the financial markets feared sovereign debt default. 
As they could not attack national currencies thanks to the monetary union, the financial markets 
concentrated their attacks on the public bonds. Interest rates soared, first, in Ireland and in 
Greece, then in other Southern European countries while they remained very low in Germany, 
but also in France. The existence of the monetary union was at stake and a reversal only took 
place after the announcement of the ECB in September 2012 to intervene without restriction on 
the public bonds secondary markets in case of necessity (see figure 2). 
But this ECB intervention was accompanied by very restrictive fiscal policies in the framework 
of the Fiscal Pact and by structural reforms in favor of more liberalization. 
Figure 2: 10-years government real interest rates in percent 
 
Source: European Central Bank’s Statistical Data Warehouse. 
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On the whole, results have been uneven amongst member states. Real devaluation has been 
inefficient in Greece and, to a large extent, in Portugal due to their limited degree of trade 
openness and the social cost has been high. Combined with restrictive fiscal policies, it has led 
to a deep recession which has limited the improvement of public finances. The public debt ratio 
has increased massively. In Ireland and, to a less extent, in Spain the real devaluation has been 
more operational thanks to the role played by the export sector but the initial negative shock 
has not been offset and the rate of unemployment remained high (in January 2016, the 
unemployment rate was 8.9 percent in Ireland and 20.5 percent in Spain). In Germany, between 
2000 and 2008, sharp wage and productivity adjustments have led to a large reduction of the 
German relative unit labor cost which has been preserved during the crisis.  
On the opposite, in France, the successive governments have been reluctant to implement cost 
adjustments and the euro remained overvalued. The strategy adopted has been since 2013 to 
reduce costs through tax rebates (around 1.5 percent of GDP). The target of these measures is 
not clear and they raise, at least, two questions. If the government wants to improve the 
competitiveness, this measure is inaccurate as all the firms, including those of the non-tradable 
sector like banks and retailers, can benefit of the tax rebates. Consequently, the transfer in favor 
of the tradable sector is too limited, compared with the cost disadvantage which prevails 
actually. A larger transfer would be necessary but could not be supported by public finances. If 
the target is to improve employment, as it seems to be more the case with the “Pacte de 
responsabilité et de solidarité”, the past experiences show that efficiency is not warranted and 
the problem of cost-competitiveness, which cannot be ignored, is not solved. The government 
is aware of these limits and has completed his array of measures by re-launching industrial 
policy measures (major industrial projects, innovation policy, etc.) to improve non-price 
competitiveness. This is welcome but this kind of measures takes a long time (around 10 years) 
to be fully operational. 
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The risk is therefore that any target can be reached. The competitiveness problem will remain 
and financing the current deficit might become more difficult. Tax rebates could have a limited 
impact on employment, at least as the profit margins have been reduced during the crisis, 
especially for the export sector. The financing of the tax rebates will imply public expenditures 
cuts with a negative impact on activity. The more likely outcome would be a long lasting period 
of stagnation.  
In this context, it is worthwhile, using a SFC model of a monetary union, to assess various 
alternative economic policies scenarios which try to tackle this problem of intra-European 
misalignments. 
3. SFC modeling of adjustment mechanisms in a monetary union 
3.1. The structure of the model 
An asymmetric two-country SFC model of a monetary union allows a consistent description of 
assets and liabilities of all associated real and financial flows. The monetary union is composed 
of two countries ( n  and s ) with an asymmetry of size. The country n  is five times larger than 
the country s . This configuration facilitates analyzing the adjustment mechanisms of the 
country s  facing the rest of the monetary union. 
We introduce in this model the possibility of public federal expenditures and Eurobonds. This 
will open the road to investigate stabilizing effects of Eurobonds. Firms can accumulate both 
real and financial capital. They can finance their investments by non-distributed profits, bank 
loans or equities. Commercial banks are able to supply credit and to ration credit. The single 
central bank (ECB) refinances the commercial banks. Households hold banking deposits, bonds 
and equities. The two national governments issue bonds and Treasury bills. 
In table 2, we describe the balance sheet in terms of assets (written with a positive sign) and 
liabilities (written with a negative sign) of each sector: households, firms, government, 
commercial banks, the single central bank and a federal budget. 
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Table 2: Balance sheet of a monetary union 
 Country n   Country s   
 HH  F  G  B  FB  ECB  HH  F  G  B     
C   nk       sk    0 
D  nbd    nbd    sbd    sbd  0 
Cs  nhh    nh   h  shh    sh  0 
Cr  
 nl   
n
nl       
n
sl  
0 
   
s
nl       
s
sl  
R     nrf   n srf rf     srf  0 
Bd  
n
n npb b   n npb b     
n
n spb b     
0 
s
s npb b       
s
s spb b     
E      nbte       0 
Bi  
  nbt  
n
nbt       
n
sbt  
0 
   
s
nbt       
s
sbt  
Eq  
n
n npe eh  
n
n npe ee      
n
n spe eh  
n
n spe ee    
0 
 n npe e          
s
s npe eh  
s
s npe ee      
s
s spe eh  
s
s spe ee    
0 
       s spe e    
W  nvh  nv  nd  nvb  nde   svh  sv  sd  svb  0 
   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Notes: For the agents in the economy, HH  stands for households, F  for firms, G  for national government, B  
for private banks and FB  stands for federal budget or a federal institution in charge of the emission of Eurobonds. 
For the type of financial assets held and issued in the economy, C  stands for physical capital, D  for deposits, 
Cs   for cash, Cr  for credit, R  for advances of the central bank, Bd  for bonds, E  for Eurobonds, Bi  for bills, 
Eq  for equities and W  stands for wealth. 
 
Beyond physical capital ( k ), eight kinds of monetary or financial assets are distinguished2: 
bank deposits ( bd ) held by households, bonds issued by governments ( .pb b ) and held by 
households of both countries, loans ( l ) supplied by each commercial bank to firms of the two 
countries, equities issued by firms ( .pe e ) and held by households and firms of both countries, 
Treasury bills issued by each State ( bt ) and held by commercial banks of both countries, high 
                                                 
2 When there are two symbols ( n  and s ), the subscript denotes the country where the asset is held, the superscript 
the country where the asset is issued. For example, 
s
nbt  represents the amount of bills held by country n  and 
issued by the country s . 
sl
s spb b
nbte sbte
sbt
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powered money ( h ) held by households ( hh ) as well as by commercial banks (mandatory 
reserves), advances supplied by the central bank to commercial banks ( rf ) and finally 
Eurobonds ( bte ) issued by a federal authority and held by banks. 
Our model relies on the main features of the contributions of Duwicquet and Mazier (2010, 
2011) and Duwicquet et al. (2013). Nevertheless, several crucial changes are included to 
examine current developments in the eurozone crisis: 
 Interest rates on Treasury bills supplied by the State are endogenous. The demand of 
Treasury bills by private banks is an increasing function of interest rate. Thus, in case 
of an insufficient demand, this mechanism induces upward pressures on interest rates. 
 Budgetary policy is partially endogenous and is linked to financial markets. When 
interest rates on sovereign debt increase, the national government can reduce public 
expenditures in reaction. 
 The possibility to increase intra-zone financing is introduced in order to reduce the 
pressure on interest rates. This can be achieved through foreign banks purchases of 
public bonds or Treasury bills, through the European Stability Mechanism or even 
through direct intervention of the central bank on the public bond market.  
 The role of Eurobonds is examined in two ways. On the one hand, Eurobonds are 
aimed at pooling a part of sovereign debt in the eurozone. On the other hand, 
Eurobonds could be used to finance European investment projects in various sectors 
namely education, health and innovation. 
 Last the rather traditional policy mix combining tax rebates and expenditures cuts 
(roughly the French government strategy) is also discussed. 
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The main equations are presented below. The model has been calibrated to represent the 
structure of the European Monetary Union. The value of coefficients and the entire model are 
given in appendix B and C3. 
 
The demand side 
The model dynamics relies essentially on the investment function. As we can see below, 
investment reacts positively to the rate of profit and to variation of aggregate demand. It 
responds negatively to the debt structure and to credit costs. 
 
0 1 2 3 4 4
( 1) ( 1)
( 2) ( 1) ( 1)
n n n
n n n n n nn n sn s
n n n
up y l
g k k k k k rl k rl
k y k
  
     
  
  [1] 
where g  stands for the rate of accumulation of physical capital; up  represents the amount of 
undistributed profits; l  is the firms’ indebtedness; rl  is the credit cost and y  is the gross 
domestic product. 
At the macroeconomic level, an increase in investment spending will generate more profits. 
These profits will be, on the one hand, distributed in part to shareholders (here, households and 
other firms) and, on the other hand, retained. 
The household consumption function includes a positive wealth effect. This wealth effect 
describes the behavior of households which target a constant ratio between wealth and 
disposable income. 
 0 1 2 ( 1)n n n n n nc a a yh a vh      [2] 
where vh  stands for the households’ wealth and yh  for the disposable income with capital 
gains. 
 
                                                 
3 The EViews codes used for the numeric simulations are available from the authors upon request. 
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The disposable income of households is defined as the sum of after-tax labor incomes (wages) 
and after-tax capital incomes (interest rates and dividends). A part of disposable income 
augmented with capital gains is consumed whereas the residual saving corresponds to bank 
deposits, money holdings and to financial assets (bonds supplied by the State and equities 
supplied by private firms). The financial wealth covers a large array of financial assets (bank 
deposits, cash money, equities and bonds). 
The government receives taxes from households and banks, spends and pays interests. The 
public deficit is financed by issuance of bonds and Treasury bills. Supply of Treasury bills 
balances the gap between public deficit and bonds issuance thus: 
 ( 1) ( 1)n n n n n n n n n n n n nbt gn r bt b t tb teb pb b ps cl tf                [3] 
where bt  is the amount of T-bills; gn  stands for the national public expenditures; r  is the 
interest rate on T-bills; b represents the amount of bond issued; t  are the taxes paid by the 
households; tb  are the taxes paid by commercial banks; teb  are the taxes paid by the ECB; tf  
are the taxes paid by firms; ps  stands for social benefits and cl  for firms’ social contributions. 
 
The banking sector  
The central bank supplies money and provides an unlimited amount of refinancing to private 
banks at the key interest rate ( ib ) acting as the lender of last resort. The interest rate on bank 
deposit ( id ) is simply determined with a margin on the key interest rate of the central bank. 
 
n s n s
n n n n n n n nrf h l l bt bt bp bd            [4] 
 2bid ib m    [5] 
The central bank does not make any profit as in Godley and Lavoie (2007). Thus interests paid 
to the Central Bank are equal to taxes paid to the State. This is in line with the practice of most 
modern central banks in the world economy. 
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Commercial banks supply the entire amount of demanded credit: 
 n s
n n n n n n n s nl inv up pe e pe ee pe ee            [6] 
The credit market is open to foreign banks. We suppose that banks of the smaller country 
(country s ) do not lend to firms of the larger country n  ( 0nsl  ). Bank loans are allocated 
between domestic and foreign firms relatively to their respective trade openness. The interest 
rate on bank loans is endogenous and depends on the lagged value of Treasury bills’ rate of 
each country and on their own lagged value. 
 (1 ) ( 1) . ( 1)n n nrl a rl a r       [7] 
 (1 ) ( 1) . ( 1)s s srl a rl a r       [8] 
Treasury bills play a key role in the model resolution. Banks purchase a limited amount of 
Treasury bills with a demand which depends positively on the rate of interest. Thus interest 
rates become endogenous, as they adjust supply of Treasury bills determined by the public 
deficit (which has to be financed) and private demand of Treasury bills in each country. 
Bills issued by the southern country and domestically held in the private sector ( s
sbt ) as well as 
bills held in the rest of the union ( s
nbt ) depends on the interest rates differential between the two 
countries: 
1 2
s
s
ss s ss ns
bt
a r a r
y
   
1 2
s
n
ns s ns nn
bt
a r a r
y
   
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By summing demands of these two countries, we obtain the global demand for Treasury bills 
issued by the southern country: 
   1 2 1 2s ss s ss n s ns s ns n nbt a r a r y a r a r y     
The interest rate on Treasury bills issued by the southern country becomes endogenous and we 
can write: 
 
   
   
2 2
1 1
s ss n s ns n n
s
ss s ns n
bt a r y a r y
r
a y a y
 


  [9] 
 
Regarding the rest of the union (the northern country), we assume that the southern country 
does not hold bills issued by the northern country which finances its public deficit only 
domestically: 
0nsbt   
n n
nbt bt  
The global demand for Treasury bills issued by the northern country depends on the level of 
interest rate ( nr ) and the national income ( ny ): 
 1
2
n nn nn
n
nn
r a y
bt
b

  
Consequently, we have the following interest rate determination for the northern country: 
 21
nn n
n nn
n
b bt
r a
y
    [10] 
After an increase of public deficit, the public deficit remains financed by commercial banks. 
However, the level of interest rates is higher. This tightening of financial conditions is partially 
transmitted to rates on bank loans granted to firms and to interest rates on public bonds which 
are supposed to be equal to interest rates on Treasury bills. 
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Baseline scenario 
Our model represents a monetary union characterized by a sluggish growth in the baseline 
scenario (around 1 percent per year). The entire model and main characteristics of the baseline 
scenario are given in appendix C. Sensitivity tests have been conducted on the most relevant 
parameters. They are also available in the appendix D. They show a rather good robustness of 
the results. From this baseline scenario, we simulate an asymmetric loss of competitiveness in 
the southern country due to an exchange rate misalignment. This can be seen as a shortcut as 
the current imbalances in the eurozone have various origins (wage policies, debt-led growth in 
the non-tradable sector, etc.) as underlined by Belabed et alii (2013). Within the monetary union 
price re-alignments are not possible via exchange rates, leading to exchange rate misalignments, 
as they have been estimated. To illustrate the loss competitiveness, the term ti  is equal to 10 
between periods 10 and 45 in the import equations: 
 0 1 2 2log( ) log( ) log log
n s
n n n n
n s
w ti w ti
im y
y y
   
    
      
   
  [11] 
 0 1 2 2log( ) log( ) log log
s n
s s s s
s n
w ti w ti
im y
y y
   
    
      
   
  [12] 
This shock deteriorates the current account of the southern country and improves external trade 
of the northern country. Consequently, we observe a decline of national income in the South 
and an increase of national income in the North. In order to investigate the current developments 
of the eurozone crisis, we compare the effect of this shock in different versions of the model. 
In addition to the baseline scenario, five versions of the model will be examined. 
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3.2. Alternative scenarios of economic policies 
Scenario 1: Budget cuts 
In this first scenario, public expenditures become endogenous and react to rising interest rates 
on Treasury bills: 
 
1 2( 1) ( 1)n gg n gg n ngn a gn a r bt      [13] 
In line with the objectives of the revised Stability and Growth Pact as well as aims of the Fiscal 
Compact, we assume that the government targets to reach a debt-GDP ratio of 70 percent in 
period 45. To achieve this challenge, the government progressively reduces its public 
expenditures. The speed of public expenditures reduction is governed by the evolution of 
interest rates. The year of the shock, public expenditures decrease by 0.2 percent of GDP 
relatively to the baseline scenario. In the baseline scenario, publics expenditures amount to 19.5 
percent of GDP in period 45. In the first scenario, they drop to 12 percent of GDP in period 45. 
Scenario 2: Intra zone financing 
We investigate, here, implications of financial support granted by the northern country to the 
southern country. In the wake of a loss of competitiveness in the southern country, the issuance 
of public securities will rise to finance an increasing deficit. We assume that private banks of 
the northern country will sustain a supplementary demand to bring down interest rates. This 
scenario can also be seen as an illustration of the European Stability Mechanism where northern 
countries grant loans with low rates of interest to southern countries. Similar effects are also 
expected if the Central Bank purchases directly Treasury bills of southern countries. In each 
case, the southern country receives financial aid to reduce the debt burden substantially. 
Scenario 3: Issuance of Eurobonds   
In this scenario, Eurobonds are issued in order to mutualize partially sovereign debt of southern 
countries. We assume that there is threshold (a debt-GDP ratio of 60 percent) from which 
Eurobonds are issued to finance public debt in the eurozone as a substitute to national debt. 
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Nevertheless, national governments have to pay interest on issued Eurobonds. Southern 
countries must be committed to stabilize their public debt. 
 
 
60%
( 1) ( 1) . ( 1)
n
n
n
n n n n n n n n n n n n n n
d
If then
y
bt g r bt b t tb teb pb b ps cl tf reuro bte

               
  [14] 
 
 
60%
( 1) ( 1 ( 1 ) . )
s
s
s
s s s s s s s s s s s s s s
d
If then
y
bt g r bt b t tb teb pb b ps cl tf reuro bte

               
  [15] 
Each government may appeal the issuance of Eurobonds ( nbte  for the northern government and 
sbte  for the southern government). 
 
 
60%
( 1) ( 1)
n
n
n
n n n n n n n n n n n n n n
d
If then
y
bte g r bt b t tb teb pb b ps cl tf ge

              
  [16] 
 
 
60%
( 1) ( 1)
s
s
s
s s s s s s s s s s s s s s
d
If then
y
bte g r bt b t tb teb pb b ps cl tf ge

              
  [17] 
The global offering of Eurobonds is obtained by the sum of the two countries 
 n sbte bte bte    [18] 
Demand for Eurobonds simply depends on the interest rate ( reuro ) and the level of GDP of 
the entire eurozone ( e n sy y y  ). 
 0
1
e e
e
reuro a y
bte
a

  
In the model, we use the following determination of interest rates: 
 0 1e e
e
bte
reuro a a
y
 
   
 
  [19] 
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Scenario 4: Issuance of Eurobonds and European projects 
To complete the previous scenario, Eurobonds are used as a tool to finance European projects 
in growth sectors. Southern countries as well as northern countries can use Eurobonds in order 
to stimulate their economic growth. 
Scenario 5: Tax rebate and public expenditures cuts 
In this scenario describing roughly the French “Crédit d'impôt pour la compétitivité et l'emploi 
(CICE)” and the “Pacte de responsabilité et de solidarité” the government reduces the social 
contributions paid by the firms to partly compensate the competitiveness loss due to the 
overvaluation ( 1.5trs   for 10ti   in period 10 in scenario 5). To avoid an increase of the 
public debt, public expenditures are cut in the same proportion (
1 ( 1)s gg sgs a gs trs   in period 
10 in scenario 6). However, these measures are not sufficiently devoted to the tradable sector 
and the effect on employment, which is the other main target, is uncertain. That is why the 
government toolkit includes also industrial policy measures such as innovation and technology 
policy or relocation policy. These measures are complex to design and to manage and their 
effects are only in the long run. As an illustration and in an optimistic way, it is assumed that 
after period 30 the non-price competitiveness of country s  is improved (the import income 
elasticity of country s , 1s  declines from 1 to 0.98 while the import income elasticity of country 
n , 1n  increases from 1 to 1.02 in scenario 7). 
3.3. Adjustments in the monetary union and economic policies 
In figure 3, we can observe the evolution of interest rates and public debt in the southern country 
in the baseline scenario (competitiveness loss in the southern country) and in the first four 
versions of the model. 
In the baseline scenario, we assume that any adjustment mechanism is implemented to face the 
competitiveness loss. Thus, this competitiveness loss widens the external deficit and in the same 
time increases the need of external financing. In addition, the negative impact of trade deficit 
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on the GDP implies a diminution of taxes collected by the government and thus an increase of 
the public deficit. On Treasury bills market, interest rates increase alongside the debt increase 
and the slowdown of GDP. This “snowball” effect implies a tremendous increase in debt levels 
(140 percent of GDP in period 45) and of interest rates (4.5 percent in period 45). 
Figure 3: Evolutions of public debt and interest rate in the southern country 
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Source: authors’ calculations. 
In order to eschew another “Greek drama”, European authorities can react by implementing 
various economics policies to achieve more sustainable adjustments. 
In the first scenario, the government tries to reduce its public expenditures in order to prevent 
an increase of interest rates. The long run purpose of this policy is to reach a debt-to-GDP ratio 
limited to 70 percent. However, due to the Keynesian multiplier effect, public expenditures 
reduction puts a huge strain on economic activity as we can see in figure 4. Interest rates are 
reduced compared with the baseline scenario but still rise in the medium run and reach 2.8 
percent in period 45 due to a smaller demand of Treasury bills induced by the decline of the 
activity. 
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Figure 4: Relative GDP and current account in the southern country 
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Source: authors’ calculations. 
In the second scenario, we assume that intra-zone financing is large thanks to an eased demand 
from private banks of the Northern countries or to the implementation of a European Stability 
Mechanism. This allows to keep interest rates at low level (2.4 percent in period 45) in spite of 
a huge increase of public debt-to-GDP ratio (130 percent in period 45). The negative impact on 
economic growth is largely offset in the long run but the competitiveness problem is not solved 
(see figure 4). We can notice that the Treaty ratified in March 2012 which gives an institutional 
background to the European Stability Mechanism stipulates that members States must reach a 
debt-to-GDP ratio of 60 percent in the medium run. The results of the second scenario will be 
greatly affected if the objective fixed by the European Stability Mechanism was respected. In 
such a case the result in terms of relative growth rates would be largely similar to those of the 
first scenario. 
The third and the fourth scenario analyze the impact of an issuance of Eurobonds in the 
eurozone. We can observe that interest rates increase less rapidly in the fourth scenario than the 
third scenario. In the fourth scenario, Eurobonds finance investments in growth sectors 
therefore economic growth is stronger and upward pressures on interest rates are weaker. 
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Figure 5: Relative GDP and current account in the northern country 
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Source: authors’ calculations. 
These growth gaps can be observed in the figure 4. We compute adjustments on GDP thanks to 
the following formula: 
      
    
 
 
competitiveness loss with adjustment competitiveness loss without adjustment
competitiveness loss without adjustment
GDP GDP
RelativeGDP
GDP


 
Initially, the GDP drops after the negative competitiveness shock. The implementation of 
European projects financed by Eurobonds (scenario 4) absorbs completely the competitiveness 
loss in the long run as GDP returns to its value before the shock in period 45. Eurobonds 
issuance to mutualize partially sovereign debt (scenario 3) induces a partial adjustment. We can 
notice that intra-zone financing (scenario 2) appears to be more efficient than Eurobonds 
issuance alone (scenario 3). The implementation of a European Stability Mechanism aimed at 
providing low interest rates to governments and firms stimulates investment. In terms of relative 
growth, the worst case is the first scenario where governments implement drastic budget cuts 
in order to achieve a debt-to-GDP ratio of 70 percent in the long run. The GDP drops by 30 
percent in relative terms in period 45. The slowdown of economic activity induces a decrease 
of imports and then a massive adjustment of the current account balance. Without any policy 
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reactions (baseline scenario) after the competitiveness loss, external deficits of the southern 
country steadily increase and reach 3.5 percent of GDP in period 45. In other scenarios, we 
observe a stabilization of the external deficit around 2 percent in the long run. 
Figure 6: Interest rate and public debt in scenario 3 and 4 
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In figure 5, we can analyze the consequences of the various scenarios in the northern country 
in terms of growth and public debt. Again, drastic budget cuts in the southern country have 
negative impact on economic activity even in the northern country. In the long run, the fall of 
GDP will bring public debt to 65 percent of GDP. In other scenarios, public debt increases less 
thanks to a stronger growth, particularly in the fourth scenario. 
According to our numerical simulations, the emission of Eurobonds constitutes a useful tool to 
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reignite growth in the entire eurozone. Figure 6 shows levels of public debt and evolution of 
interest rates on Treasury bills and Eurobonds in the third and the fourth scenario. 
As growth is stronger in the fourth scenario, interest rates on national T-bills are lower when 
Eurobonds play a role in financing the real economy. Conversely, the interest rate on Eurobonds 
is slightly higher in the fourth scenario (1.9 percent) than in the third scenario (1.6 percent). 
Regarding levels of public debt, again, European debt in Eurobonds is higher in the fourth (20 
percent of GDP) relatively to the third scenario (10 percent of GDP). Nevertheless, European 
indebtedness remains sustainable as well as national indebtedness in spite of the fact that 
national governments have to pay interests on these issued Eurobonds. 
We now move towards the last scenarios with tax rebate and public expenditures cuts. In 
scenario 5, the reduction of the social contributions paid by firms partly offsets the effect of 
overvaluation of the euro for southern countries and their loss of competitiveness. The GDP fall 
is less pronounced but the balance trade deterioration remains while the public deficit and debt 
increase a lot, inducing a substantial increase of interest rates (see figure 7). To avoid this 
unsustainable worsening of the public finance, public expenditures are cut of an amount 
equivalent to the tax rebate (scenario 6). This limits partly the rise of the public debt and of the 
interest rate but at the detriment of the GDP growth which returns to the depressed baseline 
scenario. This strategy of the French “Pacte de responsabilité et de solidarité” uses 
simultaneously the accelerator and the brake and can have only a limited effect. The initial tax 
rebate represents a high cost for the public finances without being targeted on the tradable 
sector, mainly due to European competition rules. The only way of escape would be the success 
of industrial and innovation policies able to improve at medium term the non-price 
competitiveness, as it is illustrated in the scenario 7. This can be seen as a relevant perspective 
but it would face many institutional and political obstacles. 
  
24 
Figure 7: Tax rebate and public expenditures cuts (scenarios 5 to 7) 
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Source: authors’ calculations. 
4. Conclusion 
If European authorities do not react by implementing new economic policies to achieve 
sustainable adjustments, the intra-European exchange rates misalignments and the 
competitiveness loss in southern countries induce stagnation in southern countries, diverging 
current account imbalances and public debt increases with rising interest rates. Restrictive fiscal 
policies, as they have been implemented in southern countries, can contain interest and public 
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indebtedness but at the cost of a deeper recession. This policy-mix based on tax rebate to 
improve competitiveness and public expenditures cuts, illustrated by the French “Pacte de 
responsabilité et de solidarité”, has only a limited effect.  
Increasing intra-European financing by banks of northern countries or by the European Stability 
Mechanism or even by the intervention of the ECB itself could contribute to reduce the debt 
burden and induce a partial recovery. But the problem of competitiveness of the southern 
countries would not be solved and public debt would increase (scenario 2). 
Implementation of euro-bonds as a tool to partly mutualize European sovereign debt would 
have a rather similar positive impact, but with a public debt limited to 70 percent of GDP, which 
could be considered as an important advantage (scenario 3). Furthermore, Eurobonds could also 
be used to finance large European projects which could impulse a stronger recovery in the entire 
eurozone with stabilized current account imbalances (scenario 4). To improve non-price 
competitiveness, it could (and should) be completed by more structural policies (industrial and 
innovation policies) which are complicated to implement and effective only in the long run. 
However, the creation of a European institution in charge of the emission of Eurobonds would 
face strong political obstacles. The northern countries fear that Eurobonds would give to the 
southern countries the opportunity to continue irrelevant policies. They would ask that the 
launching of Eurobonds would be accompanied by more restrictive fiscal policy in the respect 
of the Stability pact and by a stricter monitoring of national fiscal policies. This could generate 
numerous political tensions between Member States. Actually, the European Stability 
Mechanism organizes the rescue of countries facing difficulties only under the condition of a 
strict control of the public finance. In such a configuration, Eurobonds as tool to mutualize the 
debt would not be of a large help compared with the present institutional framework. On the 
opposite the southern countries could argue that a part of the debt induced by the overvaluation 
of their euro could be financed by Eurobonds without being subjected to tougher constraints. 
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Finally, the efficiency of these institutional innovations inside the monetary union could be 
compared with an alternative framework where the possibility of intra-European exchange rate 
adjustments would be reintroduced thanks to a new type of monetary regime (cohabitation of a 
global euro with national euros, new European Monetary System with a euro reduced to a 
simple ECU, exit of the Germany or of southern countries). These various monetary regimes 
are a more straightforward solution to the problem of competitiveness of southern countries and 
allow a more efficient adjustment at short term, with a more balanced growth regime at medium 
term (Mazier and Valdecantos, 2015). They could also be completed by structural policies to 
improve non-price competitiveness. However, the main difficulty raised by this alternative 
strategy is the transition period which would be difficult to manage with the risk of capital 
flights and multiple bank crises. 
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Appendix A: Methodological note on the underlying current account 
A simple foreign trade model is used for all the countries with export and import equations for 
goods and services related to real exchange rates, domestic output gap for import and foreign 
output gap for export. The interested reader could consult the IMF occasional paper 167 in 
which this correction is completely described (Bayoumi and Faruqee, 1998). Lagged effects of 
exchange rate variations are spread on three years ( t  : 0.6; 1t   : 0.25 and 2t   : 0.15). Export 
price in domestic currency is independent from the real exchange rate while on the contrary 
import price in domestic currency depends immediately and completely of the exchange rate 
variation. The current account in percentage of GDP can be written as: 
       
   
1 20,6 0,25 0 15m x
m x
CA Y M Y X Y R R R M Y R
M Y YGAP X Y YGAPF
  
 
        
 
,
 
where YGAPF  is the average output gap of the main partners; R , the logarithm of the real 
exchange rate (an increase of R  indicates a depreciation); x , m , the long run export and 
import price elasticities, respectively; x , m , long run export and import volume elasticities, 
respectively. 
In case of real appreciation (a decrease of ), import in volume increases while exports 
decreases with lagged effects of the exchange rate variations but current account is improved 
thanks to cheaper imports. Last rising domestic output gap has a negative impact on current 
account while foreign output gap has an opposite effect. The underlying current account is the 
current account corrected by the effects of past and present exchange rate variations and by the 
effects of the domestic and foreign output gaps: 
     UND m xCA Y M Y X Y R M Y R         
By substitution, we obtain: 
     
   
10,4 0,15UND m x
m x
CA Y CA Y M Y X Y R R
M Y YGAP X Y YGAPF
 
 
       
 
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Appendix B: Main parameters 
Table B1. Value of the parameters for the model of a monetary union 
Main parameters 
Investment made by firms of country N(S) 
0nk  0sk  Autonomous component 0.055 0.057 
1nk  1sk  Marginal impact of firms’ profit 0.525 0.525 
2nk  2sk  Accelerator effect 0 0 
3nk  3sk  Marginal impact of firms’ indebtedness 0.1 0.1 
4nnk  4ssk  Marginal impact of rate on loans granted by country N(S) banks 0.375 0.475 
4snk  4nsk  Marginal impact of rate on loans granted by country S(N) banks 0.125 0.025 
n  s  Rate of depreciation 0.05 0.05 
External trade of country N(S) 
0n  0s  Autonomous component -1.39 -3 
1n  1s  Income elasticity 1 1 
2  2  Price elasticity 0.5 0.5 
Consumption 
1na  1sa  Marginal propensity to consume out of disposable income 0.75 0.75 
2na  2sa  Marginal propensity to consume out of wealth 0.04 0.04 
Cash money held by households 
0n  0s  Cash to consumption ratio 0.15 0.15 
Rate of interest on T-bills issued by country N(S) 
1nna  - Autonomous component (country N) 0.3 - 
1ssa  - Marginal impact of growth (country S) 0.3 - 
2nnb  - Marginal impact of supply of T-bills in percent of GDP (country N) 0.2 - 
1nsa  - Marginal impact of growth of country N on rate of country S 1 - 
2ssa  2nsa  Marginal impact of rates of country N on rate of country S 1.3 1 
Eurobonds 
1ea  - Autonomous component 0.2 - 
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2ea  - Marginal impact of supply of T-bills in percent of GDP 0.15 - 
Rate of interest on bank loans 
a  - Marginal impact of rate on T-bills 0.1 - 
High powered money (HPM) 
n  s  HPM-bank deposit ratio 0.05 0.05 
2bm   - Banks margin 0.005 - 
Tax rates 
bn  bs  Banks 0.176 0.176 
n  s  Personal income tax rate 0.13 0.13 
nf  sf  Firms tax rate 0.35 0.35 
n  s  Social contributions rate 0.36 0.36 
nsf   ssf  Rate of undistributed firms’ profit  0.419 0.419 
0nr  0sr  Wage share 0.646 0.646 
Demand of country N bonds by households of country N 
0nnbv  Autonomous demand 0.047 
1nnbv  
Marginal impact of rate on country N 
bonds 
2 
2nnbv  
Marginal impact of rate on country S 
bonds 
2 
3nnbv  
Marginal impact of rate on bank 
deposits 
0.2 
4nnbv  
Marginal impact of rate on return of 
country N equities 
0.1 
5nnbv  
Marginal impact of rate on return of 
country S equities 
0.1 
Demand of country S bonds by households of country N 
0nsbv  Autonomous demand 0.047 
1nsbv  
Marginal impact of rate on country S 
bonds 
2 
2nsbv  
Marginal impact of rate on country N 
bonds 
2 
3nsbv  
Marginal impact of rate on bank 
deposits 
0.2 
4nsbv  
Marginal impact of rate on return of 
country N equities 
0.1 
5nsbv  
Marginal impact of rate on return of 
country S equities 
0.1 
Demand of country S bonds by households of country S 
0ssbv  Autonomous demand 0.081 
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1ssbv  
Marginal impact of rate on country S 
bonds 
2 
2ssbv  
Marginal impact of rate on country N 
bonds 
2 
3ssbv  
Marginal impact of rate on bank 
deposits 
0.2 
4ssbv  
Marginal impact of rate on return of 
country N equities 
0.1 
5ssbv  
Marginal impact of rate on return of 
country S equities 
0.1 
Demand of country N equities by households of country N 
0nnev  Autonomous demand 0.476 
1nnev  
Marginal impact of rate on country N 
bonds 
0.01 
2nnev  
Marginal impact of rate on country S 
bonds 
0.01 
3nnev  
Marginal impact of rate on bank 
deposits 
0.2 
4nnev  
Marginal impact of rate on return of 
country N equities 
0.02 
5nnev  
Marginal impact of rate on return of 
country S equities 
0.02 
Demand of country S equities by households of country N 
0nsev  Autonomous demand 0.213 
1nsev  
Marginal impact of rate on country N 
bonds 
0.01 
2nsev  
Marginal impact of rate on country S 
bonds 
0.01 
3nsev  
Marginal impact of rate on bank 
deposits 
0.2 
4nsev  
Marginal impact of rate on return of 
country N equities 
0.02 
5nsev  
Marginal impact of rate on return of 
country S equities 
0.02 
Demand of country S equities by households of country S 
0ssev  Autonomous demand 0.625 
1ssev  
Marginal impact of rate on country N 
bonds 
0.01 
2ssev  
Marginal impact of rate on country S 
bonds 
0.01 
3ssev  
Marginal impact of rate on bank 
deposits 
0.2 
4ssev  
Marginal impact of rate on return of 
country N equities 
0.02 
5ssev  
Marginal impact of rate on return of 
country S equities 
0.02 
Demand of country N equities by households of country S 
0snev  Autonomous demand 0.0315 
1snev  
Marginal impact of rate on country N 
bonds 
0.01 
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2snev  
Marginal impact of rate on country S 
bonds 
0.01 
3snev  
Marginal impact of rate on bank 
deposits 
0.2 
4snev  
Marginal impact of rate on return of 
country N equities 
0.02 
5snev  
Marginal impact of rate on return of 
country S equities 
0.02 
3ssf  Marginal impact of firms’ profit 0.6 
Price of firms’ equities 
,n s   Growth rate 1.003 
Government expenditures 
1gga  Growth rate 1.018 
2gga  Marginal impact of debt service 0 
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Appendix C: Entire model and baseline 
Table C1. Variables involved in the model of a monetary union   
Variable Name 
Endogenous Variables 
,n sy y  National income, in real terms 
,n sydh ydh  Real disposable income 
,n scl cl  Firm’s social contributions 
,n sps ps  Social benefits 
,n syh yh  Haig–Simons real disposable income 
,n st t  Personal income tax 
,n stf tf  Taxes on firms 
,n sc c  Households consumption 
,n sbd bd  Bank deposit held by households 
,h scgh cgh  Households’ capital gains 
,n svh vh  Households’ wealth 
n
nb  Demand of country N bonds by households of country N 
s
nb  Demand of country S bonds by households of country N 
s
sb  Demand of country S bonds by households of country S 
n
neh  Demand of country N equities by households of country N 
s
neh  Demand of country S equities by households of country N 
s
seh  Demand of country S equities by households of country S 
n
seh  Demand of country N equities by households of country S 
,n shh hh  Cash money held by households 
,n sup up  Firms’ retained earnings 
,n sg g  Accumulation rate 
,n sinv inv  Investment made by firms 
,n sk k  Firms’ fixed capital stock 
,n nl l  Loans supplied by private banks to firms 
n
nee  Demand of country N equities by firms of country N 
s
nee  Demand of country S equities by firms of country N 
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Variable Name 
n
see  Demand of country N equities by firms of country S 
s
see  Demand of country S equities by firms of country S 
,n sre re  Rate on return of equities 
,n se e  Number of equities 
,n sv v  Firms’ wealth 
,n scge cge  Firms’ capital gains 
,n sw w  Wage share 
,n sdiv div  Dividends distributed by firms 
n
ndive  
Dividends distributed by country N firms to country N 
firms 
n
ndivh  
Dividends distributed by country N firms to country N 
households 
n
sdive  
Dividends distributed by country N firms to country S 
firms 
n
sdivh  
Dividends distributed by country N firms to country S 
households 
s
sdive  Dividends distributed by country S firms to country S firms 
s
sdivh  
Dividends distributed by country S firms to country S 
households 
s
ndive  
Dividends distributed by country S firms to country N 
firms 
s
ndivh  
Dividends distributed by country S firms to country N 
households 
,n sbt bt  Treasury bills held by banks 
,n sb b  Bonds held by households 
,n spb pb  Price of bonds held by households 
,n sd d  Public debt 
n
nl  Loans supplied by country N banks to country N firms 
s
sl  Loans supplied by country S banks to country S firms 
n
nbt  
T-bills issued by country N government held by country N 
banks  
s
sbt  
T-bills issued by country S government held by country S 
banks 
,n sbp bp  Banks’ profit 
,n stb tb  Taxes on banks 
,n srf rf  Central bank advances made to private banks 
,n sh h  
Cash money held by private banks 
,n svb vb  
Private banks’ wealth 
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Variable Name 
, ,n steb teb teb  Taxes on Central bank advances made to private banks 
,n sim im  Imports 
,n sx x  Exports 
n
sl  Loans supplied by country S banks to country N firms 
s
nl  Loans supplied by country N banks to country S firms 
s
nbt  
T-bills issued by country S government held by country N 
banks 
h  High powered money (HPM) 
,n srl rl  Interest rate on loans 
id  Interest rate on bank deposit 
,n sr r  Interest rate on Treasury bills 
, ,n sbte bte bte  Eurobonds 
reuro  Interest rate on Eurobonds 
Exogenous variables 
,n sgn gn  National government expenditures 
,n sge ge  Federal government expenditures 
trs  Reduction of firm’s social contributions 
,n spe pe  Price of equities 
2bm  Private banks’ margin on banks deposit 
ib  Rate of interest on central bank advances 
ti  Competitiveness loss parameter (currency overvaluation) 
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Baseline model 
           nn n n n n ny c inv g x im       [20] 
           ss s s s s sy c inv g x im       [21] 
 ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)n s n sn n n n n n n n n nydh id bd b b divh divh t ps cl             [22] 
 ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)s n s ns s s s s s s s s sydh id bd b b divh divh t ps cl             [23] 
 n n ncl w   [24] 
 s s scl w   [25] 
 n n nps t tf      [26] 
 s s sps t tf      [27] 
 n n nyh ydh cgh    [28] 
 s s syh ydh cgh    [29] 
 ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)n s n sn n n n n n n n nt w b b id bd divh divh              [30] 
 ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)s n s ns s s s s s s s st w b b id bd divh divh              [31] 
 ( 1) ( 1) ( 2) ( 2)n n n sn nf n n n n s s n n ntf y w rl l rl l div dive dive                [32] 
 ( 1) ( 1) ( 2) ( 2)s s s ns sf s s s s n n s s stf y w rl l rl l div dive dive                [33] 
 0 1 2 ( 1)n n n n n nc a a yh a vh      [34] 
 0 1 2 ( 1)s s s s s sc a a yh a vh      [35] 
 n s n sn n n n n s n n n s s nbd ydh c pb b pb b pe eh pe eh hh              [36] 
 s n s ns s s s s n s s s n n sbd ydh c pb b pb b pe eh pe eh hh              [37] 
 ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)n s n sh n n s n n n s ncgh pb b pb b pe eh pe eh           [38] 
 ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1)s n s ns s s n s s s n scgh pb b pb b pe eh pe eh           [39] 
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 n s n s
n n n n s n n n s n nvh bd pb b pb b pe eh pe eh hh        [40] 
 s n s n
s s s s n s s s n s svh bd pb b pb b pe eh pe eh hh        [41] 
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5nnb nnb n nnb s nnb nnb n nnb s nn
n
n
v v rb v rb v id v re v re vh
b
pb
         [42] 
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5nsb nsb s nsb n nsb nsb n nsb s ns
n
s
v v rb v rb v id v re v re vh
b
pb
         [43] 
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5ssb ssb s ssb n ssb ssb n ssb s ss
s
s
v v rb v rb v id v re v re vh
b
pb
         [44] 
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5nne nne n nne s nne nne n nne s nn
n
n
v v rb v rb v id v re v re vh
eh
pe
         [45] 
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5nse nse n nse s nse nse n nse s ss
n
s
v v rb v rb v id v re v re vh
eh
pe
         [46] 
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5sse sse n sse s sse sse n sse s ss
s
s
v v rb v rb v id v re v re vh
eh
pe
         [47] 
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5sne sne n sne s sne sne n sne s sn
s
n
v v rb v rb v id v re v re vh
eh
pe
         [48] 
 0n nhh c   [49] 
 0s shh c   [50] 
 ( 1) ( 1)n n n sn n n n n s s n n n nfup y w rl l rl l div dive dive t              [51] 
 ( 1) ( 1)s s s ns s s s s n n s s s sfup y w rl l rl l div dive dive t trs               [52] 
 
0 1 2 3 4 4
( 1) ( 1)
( 2) ( 1) ( 1)
n n n
n n n n n nn n sn s
n n n
up y l
g k k k k k rl k rl
k y k
  
     
  
  [53] 
 
0 1 2 3 4 4
( 1) ( 1)
( 2) ( 1) ( 1)
s s s
s s s s s ss s ns n
s s s
up y l
g k k k k k rl k rl
k y k
  
     
  
  [54] 
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 ( 1)n n ninv g k    [55] 
 ( 1)s s sinv g k    [56] 
 ( 1)n n n nk inv k      [57] 
 ( 1)s s s sk inv k      [58] 
 n s
n n n n n n n s nl inv up pe e pe ee pe ee           [59] 
 s n
s s s s s s s n sl inv up pe e pe ee pe ee           [60] 
 
 1 2 3 0
( 1)
n sn
nn n nn s nn nn n n n s n
nn
n
n
up
f re f re f f k pe ee pe ee
k
ee
pe
  
      
     [61] 
 
 1 2 3 0
( 1)
n sn
ns s ns n ns ns n n n s n
ns
n
s
up
f re f re f f k pe ee pe ee
k
ee
pe
  
      
     [62] 
 
 1 2 3 0
( 1)
n ss
sn n sn s sn sn s n s s s
sn
s
n
up
f re f re f f k pe ee pe ee
k
ee
pe
  
      
     [63] 
 
 1 2 3 0
( 1)
n ss
ss s ss n ss ss s n s s s
ss
s
s
up
f re f re f f k pe ee pe ee
k
ee
pe
  
      
     [64] 
 ( 1)n n npe pe    [65] 
 ( 1)s s spe pe    [66] 
 
( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
n n
n
n n n
pe div
re
pe pe e

 
  
  [67] 
 
( 1) ( 1) ( 1)
s s
s
s s s
pe div
re
pe pe e

 
  
  [68] 
 n n n nn n n s se eh ee eh ee      [69] 
 s s s ss s s n ne eh ee eh ee      [70] 
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 n s
n n n n s n n n nv k pe ee pe ee l pe e       [71] 
 n s
s s n s s s s s sv k pe ee pe ee l pe e       [72] 
 ( 1) ( 1)n sn n n n ncge pe ee pe ee       [73] 
 ( 1) ( 1)n ss s s s scge pe ee pe ee       [74] 
 
0n nw r y   [75] 
 0s sw r y   [76] 
 (1 ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 2) ( 2)n nn n n n n s sdiv sf y w rl l rl l             [77] 
 (1 ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 2) ( 2)s ss s s s s n ndiv sf y w rl l rl l             [78] 
 
( 1)
( 1)
n
n n
n n
n
ee
dive div
e
 
  
 
  [79] 
 
( 1)
( 1)
n
n n
n n
n
eh
divh div
e
 
  
 
  [80] 
 
( 1)
( 1)
n
n s
s n
n
ee
dive div
e
 
  
 
  [81] 
 
( 1)
( 1)
n
n s
s n
n
eh
divh div
e
 
  
 
  [82] 
 
( 1)
( 1)
s
s s
s s
s
ee
dive div
e
 
  
 
  [83] 
 
( 1)
( 1)
s
s s
s s
s
eh
divh div
e
 
  
 
  [84] 
 
( 1)
( 1)
s
s n
n s
s
ee
dive div
e
 
  
 
  [85] 
 
( 1)
( 1)
s
s n
n s
s
eh
divh div
e
 
  
 
  [86] 
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 ( 1) ( 1)n n n n n n n n n n n n nbt gn r bt b t tb teb pb b ps cl tf                [87] 
 ( 1) ( 1)s s s s s s s s s s s s sbt gs r bt b t tb teb pb b ps cl tf trs                 [88] 
 n n
n n sb b b      [89] 
 s s
s s nb b b      [90] 
 
1
n
n
pb
rb
   [91] 
 
1
s
s
pb
rb
   [92] 
 n n n nd bt pb b    [93] 
 s s s sd bt pb b    [94] 
 n n
n n sl l l      [95] 
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Figure C1. Baseline simulations without competitiveness loss 
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Source: authors’ calculations. 
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Appendix D: Sensitivity analysis  
Figure D1. Impact of a competitiveness loss on country S GDP (in percent relative to the baseline)  
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